Page request with a TLS fingerprint but no browser layer (no JS ran — scripted client)

net.no_js_execution  ·  convicts

network, browserlayer
coherencecategory
23evaders caught

What it catches

A real browser loading the challenge page runs the JS collector; a scripted HTTP client (httpx/curl, the volumetric-DDoS majority) never does — cross-layer absence

Signals it reads

network.browser_absent

How it fires

present

Evaders it caught 23

azuretls camoufox ch-ua-hardcoded curl-http2 curl-impersonate go-tls go-tls-h2-rotate go-tls-madeyoureset go-tls-rotate go-tls-static-ext go-tls-web-bot-auth go-tls-web-bot-auth-replay h2-continuation-flood h2-control-flood h2-rapid-reset h2-settings-split http2-naive ip-rotation primp quic-no-grease tls-stale-template ua-rotation vanilla

Bypassed by 10

Frontier evaders that reach the detector uncaught (scored only suspicious, defeating every convicting tell) — this check is not one that stops them. The red-team frontier this detection still has to convict.

camoufox-hardened camoufox-hardened-behave camoufox-headful camoufox-linux camoufox-linux-coherent camoufox-socks-webrtc patchright-headful webrtc-leak zendriver-uach zendriver-uach-behave

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