AudioContext fingerprint differs across identical renders (per-render perturbation)
br.audio_noise · convicts
What it catches
CreepJS: a real engine is deterministic; per-render noise is farbling/anti-detect injection. v0.73.3: per-browser N/A — a privacy browser farbles/blocks audio by design (Brave Shields via browser.is_brave; Tor/Mullvad/RFP-Firefox via browser.rfp_browser), so the detector drops this artifact (detector.applicability) rather than convict a real privacy-browser user; a Chrome-claiming farbler with no such identity still convicts, and a privacy-browser-faking bot is caught by its automation tells.
Signals it reads
browser.audio_noise
How it fires
present
Evaders it caught 1
Bypassed by 10
Frontier evaders that reach the detector uncaught (scored only suspicious, defeating every convicting tell) — this check is not one that stops them. The red-team frontier this detection still has to convict.